Gilman, officially released on 21 July 2026, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Alexander Gaynor’s application for a prejudgment remedy of replevin concerning a chihuahua mix named Buzz. The plain and unambiguous wording of General Statutes § 52-515 does not provide for shared possession of a chattel, and Mr Gaynor did not seek shared possession in his application, according to the Connecticut Appellate Court Judgement. A Connecticut man who sought possession of a dog he had shared with his former partner has lost his appeal.
In Gaynor v. The court also held that his claim about proving a superior possessory interest was unreviewable.
On 22 November 2023, in anticipation of commencing litigation, Mr Gaynor filed an application for a prejudgment remedy. The opinion records that the trial court, Judge Vizcarrondo, held an evidentiary hearing on 23 and 25 July 2024 and heard testimony from seven witnesses, including both parties. The Appellate Court explained that replevin proceedings in Connecticut are governed by statute, namely General Statutes § 52-515. The opinion adds that, even if it did, Mr Gaynor’s claim as alleged in the verified complaint attached to his application was expressly predicated on § 52-515, and in his prayer for relief he sought a temporary order of replevin ordering possession of Buzz to him until a final resolution of the action, together with damages.
The Appellate Court therefore concluded that the only relief the trial court could have afforded, had it found probable cause to sustain the replevin claim, would have been the unqualified possession of Buzz pending a final resolution of the action, along with damages for the unlawful detention.
At the hearing, Mr Gaynor’s counsel agreed with the court that he was claiming a right to immediate possession but was not necessarily seeking exclusive possession, and said that if exclusive possession had to go to one party or the other, he would claim it. That section provides that the action of replevin may be maintained to recover goods or chattels in which the plaintiff has a general or special property interest with a right to immediate possession and which are wrongfully detained from him, together with damages for the wrongful detention, according to the opinion. Applying that approach, the Appellate Court concluded that the “plain and unambiguous” wording of § 52-515 does not provide for shared possession of a chattel. He did not seek shared possession in his application, and a court is not permitted to decide issues outside those raised in the pleadings, according to the opinion.
The trial court found that the parties’ possessory rights in Buzz were equal and denied the application, stating that Buzz is a chattel and not a child. The trial court added that a custody and visitation scheme is provided for in the family context. The opinion states that the court’s role is to interpret statutes as they are written and that it cannot read into them provisions that are not clearly stated.
The opinion also records, in a footnote, that Mr Gaynor commenced a separate action against Ms Gilman on 30 July 2024, with claims for breach of contract (replevin), conversion, civil theft and negligent infliction of emotional distress. That action was tried in March 2026, according to the opinion. Because appellate counsel disagrees with the strategy of trial counsel, the opinion states that this result is the same whether the matter is called induced error, waiver or abandonment, and that an appellant cannot create a reviewable claim.
The Appellate Court concluded that Mr Gaynor had prompted the error he complained of on appeal by suggesting to the trial court in his prehearing memorandum that the question was relevant, by presenting evidence on it and by arguing through counsel that he had proved it. The judgment was affirmed, and the other judges concurred.
The opinion states that he argued the elements he had to establish derived only from § 52-515 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cornelio v.
Before the trial court, Mr Gaynor had claimed that his possessory interest was superior, had cited Angrave in his prehearing memorandum for the proposition that a replevin action involves a comparison of competing rights to possess the animal, and had testified that he had cared for or had possession of Buzz for more days than Ms Gilman, according to the opinion. Mr Gaynor also claimed on appeal that the trial court wrongly required him to show that his possessory interest in Buzz was superior to Ms Gilman’s to establish his right to immediate possession. Stamford Hospital, and that the trial court had instead relied on language from the Appellate Court’s decision in Angrave v. Oates. The Appellate Court held that this claim was unreviewable. The opinion adds that, when the trial court asked about the superiority of his claim, his counsel responded that he could establish superiority.