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An Indiana man who admitted to damaging his ex-wife’s property has won an appeal against restitution orders totalling $15,017.50, after a court found that the trial judge lacked the authority to impose the payments months after sentencing. Available on Justia , the original sentencing orders did not require restitution or reserve the issue for later consideration, according to an October 23 memorandum decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals. The case involved David McDonald, who faced criminal charges after two separate incidents involving his ex-wife’s property in 2025. Later in 2025, McDonald returned to the property, poured gasoline on part of his ex-wife’s wooden fence and set it on fire. The incident led to a Level 6 felony arson charge, along with other charges.
A guilty plea does not give a court unlimited authority to change a sentence after it has been finalised. The appellate court reversed the orders and instructed the trial court to remove the unauthorised amounts from the relevant sentencing records, while leaving the man’s guilty pleas and convictions undisturbed. In February that year, McDonald went to his ex-wife’s home and threw two rocks at the house. An active protective order prohibited him from contacting her. Following the incident, the State charged him with Class B misdemeanour criminal mischief.
Plea agreement left restitution open in only one case
McDonald was also facing a separate Level 6 felony theft case involving his employer. On February 4, 2026, the court entered sentencing orders in the criminal mischief and arson cases. The restitution question returned before the trial court on May 6, when a hearing was scheduled in the separate theft case. Following the May hearing, the trial court ordered McDonald to pay his ex-wife $3,760 for the criminal mischief case and $11,257.50 for the arson case. Together, the two orders totalled $15,017.50. The trial court later amended the arson sentencing order following a June 3 hearing on McDonald’s motion to correct his credit time. However, the amended order also included the $3,760 restitution amount in its monetary obligations section. The only unresolved matters were the amount of restitution in the theft case and where McDonald would serve 365 days of his sentence. It also directed the trial court to amend the arson sentencing record to remove the $3,760 amount from the monetary obligations section. The October 23 ruling was issued as a memorandum decision and, under Indiana Appellate Rule 65(D), is not binding precedent for any court.
Because mcDonald’s former employer was not present, the trial court deferred the matter to a later hearing and proceeded to sentence him on the charges covered by the agreement, however,. McDonald challenged the restitution orders before the Indiana Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court had already entered final judgments in the criminal mischief and arson cases and therefore lacked the authority to add restitution afterwards. The court therefore reversed the restitution orders and remanded the cases with instructions to vacate the $3,760 criminal mischief order and the $11,257.50 arson order.
The agreement expressly left the amount of restitution in the theft case open for determination at a later hearing, according to the appellate decision. He subsequently entered into a single plea agreement covering these and several other pending cases. Under the agreement, he pleaded guilty to criminal mischief and arson in the cases involving his ex-wife, as well as theft in the separate case involving his employer. The dispute centred on what the plea agreement allowed the trial court to decide after sentencing. It did not include a provision requiring McDonald to pay restitution to his ex-wife in the criminal mischief and arson cases. At the sentencing hearing, the State attempted to present evidence concerning restitution in the theft case. Neither order mentioned restitution, and neither stated that the court was retaining authority to decide the issue later. During the proceedings, the prosecution sought to address restitution for the damage to McDonald’s ex-wife’s property as well. McDonald’s defence objected, arguing that the hearing was scheduled only for the theft case and that the plea agreement did not leave restitution open in the other cases. The trial court nevertheless proceeded to consider the claims. The appellate court rejected that position, noting that the discussion at sentencing concerned restitution for McDonald’s employer in the theft case, not payments to his ex-wife. The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court lacked the authority to impose restitution in the criminal mischief and arson cases after entering final sentencing orders. The judges explained that restitution forms part of a criminal sentence and that a trial court cannot ordinarily modify a sentence without continuing authority provided by the judgment, a statute or a rule. In McDonald’s case, the original sentencing orders did not reserve the restitution issue, and the plea agreement contemplated restitution only in the theft case. The appellate court also clarified that the agreement’s reference to an open plea did not give the trial court unrestricted discretion. The decision did not overturn McDonald’s guilty pleas or convictions for criminal mischief and arson. It addressed the trial court’s authority to impose the additional payments after sentencing. It may be cited for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case. You use AI every day. Now get your AI Quotient. Take the AIQ test.
The State argued that the trial court had indicated during the earlier proceedings that restitution would be addressed later.